A question of numbers: Uhuru's pyrrhic victory?

Kenyans were divided in today's electoral rerun with many choosing not to vote. So, what does this all mean for Kenya's future?

Today, Kenyans were part of one of the strangest elections ever to have taken place. In many places across the country, polling stations were empty and polling staff idle after what will most certainly be one of the lowest turnouts in Kenyan electoral history. Many Kenyans refused to vote, following the call from Opposition Leader Raila Odinga to boycott the vote. Others were simply put off by the excessive police presence and the threat of clashes with protesters. Even polling stations in the strongholds of President Uhuru Kenyatta recorded less votes than those cast during the first election in August.

All of this is a result of a lengthy saga between Uhuru and Raila, after the Supreme Court declared the initial August vote, which Uhuru claimed victory in, invalid due to irregularities. Following this, Raila had stated that he would not take part in another election unless certain conditions were met, namely that the top officials for the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission were replaced. However, no changes were made, and, as a result, Raila withdrew his candidacy, leaving Uhuru to compete against several other contenders, none of whom had polled more than 1% in the first vote.

A hollow victory

Whilst today’s vote will certainly result in an Uhuru victory, it is a hollow one. With such low turnout, it is a sign that Kenyans have little faith in the electoral process, especially after a top IEBC official fled last week to New York after stating that this would not be a credible election. The next day, the CEO of the IEBC stated that he could not guarantee a credible process.

That means that whilst he may have won, Uhuru will lack legitimacy in the eyes of a large majority of Kenyans. Furthermore, he’ll lack much needed legitimacy in the eyes of international observers and press, many of whom stated prior to any votes being cast, that they did not believe in the credibility of what was to come.

A question of legitimacy

So, where to next? Does legitimacy matter to Uhuru? Probably not. His incendiary talk before this rerun pointed to a man who saw this whole episode as a minor speedbump on the road to another five years in power. But there are those around him that know that without widespread legitimacy, he can only rule by a heavy hand, something that would damage Kenyan economic interests, an upsetting situation for various Kenyans with powerful interests and a lot of influence.

For the opposition, the low turnout is a major victory following a stratagem that represented their only real choice to move forward. It was a risky one, but it has partly paid off, allowing them a chance to continue the narrative of a sham election, one that is supported by millions of Kenyans around the country, as demonstrated by today’s events.

The protests will continue, but they will be bigger and louder. The appeals to the Supreme Court will fly in, and the judges will be unable to ignore them (as several of them tried to do the day before the election, when they failed to turn up to court to hear a petition to postpone the election citing very dodgy excuses).

The elections are over. The people have spoken. But only two men can truly end this crisis. Uhuru has two options in response to the inevitable protests: first, he could respond with strongman tactics, use police force to crush protests, whilst encouraging his own supporters to stage counter protests. The result of such a strategy is grim, likely to ditch Kenya back to the events of 2008, when post-election violence resulted in at least 1000 deaths and 3 months of violence.

His other option is communication: he must sit down with Raila and attempt to negotiate a way forward. My prediction is that if he was to pursue a solution involving Raila, it would be one proposing a coalition government. Such a proposal would probably be advantageous to Uhuru: he may have to concede something but in the end he retains the majority of power. 

No deal?

Raila, too, will have his part to play in such tactics but it seems unlikely he would be willing to enter any coalition government especially with such support having been shown for him by a lack of participation in today’s election. The likelihood of his unwillingness to concede to a coalition solution  is further strengthened by the events of the past. He entered into a coalition government in 2008 in order to resolve the post-election violence — an agreement that arguably left him with little power. What he will settle for, I cannot say, but until they sit down in a room together, we will never know.

Through all of this, there is an encouraging factor. A tweet I saw today by a political analyst stated that what gave her hope was the nature of Kenyans. They all remember what happened 10 years ago, and whilst we have already seen sporadic incidents of violence in the past months, many will never forget 2007. Furthermore, Kenyans have a unique and humorous view of politics, one that encourages some light at the end of the tunnel.

Raila's political gamble: A weary exit or stroke of genius?

Raila Odinga has announced his departure from the Kenyan electoral re-run, in protest at the lack of change in the IEBC. So, is this the end for him or is there something more afoot?

It has certainly been a bit of a whirlwind for Kenyan politics in the short time since I posted my last blog, after the Kenyan eRlection in August. Events have taken a course that I feel sure even the best political analysts could not have predicted: first, after a petition by the National Super Alliance (NASA) led by Raila Odinga, the Supreme Court annulled the election result that gave the win to President Kenyatta, on the grounds that the poll had not been transparent. 

Then, after a fresh election date was set, and after failed calls by the opposition for the IEBC leadership to be replaced, Raila Odinga announced his withdrawal from the race, citing a lack of change in any of the regulations or people who manage the election. He also objected to a proposed Bill going through Parliament, which would prevent an annulment by the Supreme Court from happening again.

A historic moment

The Supreme Court ruling was a shock to all – the first time it has happened in Africa and only the second time anywhere. The immediate reaction was (somewhat patronisingly) applause by the West (as well as some embarrassed head bobbing by those EU and US observers who had declared the poll ‘free and fair’), jubilance from Raila supporters and anger from Uhuru fans.

In fairness, it was a historic moment: a court favouring a ruling that went against a sitting head of state. In many places around the world, not just Africa, that’s dangerous territory for a Supreme Court judge to wade into. But has it all been for nothing?

Having delivered a verdict which insinuated that, in one way or another, the IEBC had messed it all up, it seemed only logical for Raila to call for fresh IEBC personnel this time around. Was he ever going to get it? Highly unlikely. The court may have demonstrated its independence but that can only go so far. And with the same IEBC in place, and the same systems, you can understand his scepticism.

Time to gamble

But Raila’s next move, whilst being a major political gamble, is a stroke of genius. On the face of it, the whole thing seems like a great PR story: as tension builds with daily protests in the streets from both sides, and little political action to change any of the status quo, perhaps withdrawing is the best thing for a country that knows the consequences of ethnic tension, particularly after the 2007 election which culminated in violence that killed over 1000 people and displaced many more. His withdrawal, therefore, is in the interests of the people of Kenya.

On another level though, it’s a plan of political brilliance, from a man who appeared to have no real options. By withdrawing he achieves two things: first, he denies Uhuru and the IEBC any real legitimacy in the upcoming elections, his own withdrawal suggesting to the world that these elections will be no different from those held previously. 

Second, it allows him time to regroup. Whilst Kenyatta runs around campaigning, he can sit back and focus on other things (an intention made clear by his upcoming tour of the UK and US), and when Kenyatta wins the election, as he most certainly will, Raila can simply challenge the result in court again (assuming that the bill stopping another annulment has not been passed). Even without the Supreme Court, many Kenyans will find it hard to accept Uhuru, after a questionable election where the opposition had such little faith in the electoral commission that it saw no choice but to not take part.

The bottom line? By not running for president, Raila is changing the discourse, and controlling the narrative. It’s a move by a man who knows he has no other real choice. And a genius one at that.

As if to confirm that this, Deputy President William Ruto, Uhuru's running mate, made comments on Wednesday that seemed like an attempt to goad Raila into re-entering the race, a sign perhaps that his withdrawal had rattled them?

With Raila, it’s hard to imagine that this will be the end. Let’s not forget, he promised his political allies, many of whom are keen to take a turn at driving, to make this his last election and you’d imagine he’d go out with a bang.

So, what then? Calls for protests? Definitely. Almost certainly a legal challenge to whatever action the IEBC decides to take to move forward in this situation. But by controlling the narrative, the ball feels firmly in his court.

A constitutional crisis?

The news continues to roll in. The day after Raila quit, parliament passed an electoral amendment, which was boycotted by opposition lawmakers, stating that if one candidate withdrew from the re-run election, the remaining one would automatically win. At the same time, the High Court approved a petition by Ekuru Aukot, another presidential hopeful, to contest the upcoming ballot, although he has not definitely said he will run. These contradictory moves by the legislature and the judiciary will further complicate any way forward and could form the beginnings of a major constitutional crisis.

What we can be sure about is that this saga has a few more chapters in it and, looking back over all that has happened in the last two months, I’m not sure anyone can say what is coming next.

Can Somalia’s president solve the problem of al-Shabaab?

As each successive Somali president has come to power, they have doen so promising to bring an end to jihadist group which has been a thorn in the government's side for over ten years now. But can the latest leader follow through?

Several days ago, fighters from al-Shabaab, a jihadist group in southern Somalia, seized the town of Kalabeyr from Somali military and African Union forces. This incident is the latest in a string of victories for the group, which has experienced a resurgence this year. 

The militants, who claim allegiance to al-Qaeda, have been plaguing the Somali government for almost a decade, whilst also executing multiple attacks in Uganda and Kenya. Successive Somali presidents have come to power promising to defeat al-Shabaab but none has succeeded. In February, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo won the latest presidential election, pledging to put an end to the jihadists. But can he have any more success than his predecessors?

Who are al-Shabaab?

al-Shabaab, which means ‘The Youth’, emerged as the radical wing of the Union of Islamic Courts, a group of Sharia courts, which controlled much of the country, including the capital Mogadishu. The Courts were overthrown in 2006, when Ethiopian forces invaded, supposedly in support of the Western-backed Federal government although this was probably more for their own geopolitical reasons, than for the benefit of their neighbours.

The remnants became al-Shabaab, whose fighters began an insurgency against the government and their allies: a conglomerate of troops deployed to Somalia as part of the AU mission (AMISOM). The militants quickly took control of much of the lower half of the country, as well as parts of Mogadishu. 

But when Kenyan forces began attacking from the south, they lost control of crucial territory, including the port of Kismayo, which served as an important source of revenue for them. However, a corrupt and ineffective government failed to take advantage of a weakened al-Shabaab and the group is now back on the front foot, gaining territory once more.

The two pronged approach

To defeat al-Shabaab, President Farmajo’s strategy relies on two approaches: first, he has promised an amnesty, aimed mostly at the low-level fighters, many of whom are Somali youths whose main motivations for fighting are money and food. 

The second approach seeks to bolster the military with trained, armed and most importantly, paid soldiers, who will be strong enough to defeat the jihadists. But this military strategy has many flaws, primarily that the army is weak, divided by clan politics and corrupt. Added to this, it is not enough to simply regain territory; to hold it, one must follow up military victories with effective political control, something the government has failed to do.

The long road ahead...

The amnesty, which has supposedly expired, has experienced minor success, with a few fighters surrendering. Alongside this, Farmajo has begun the process of strengthening the Somali military and has asked the international community, which is assisting with training, to lift an arms embargo. 

However, with AMISOM troops set to begin withdrawing next year, he has a major challenge ahead. With the help of disgruntled clans, al-Shabaab has put an ineffective Somali military on the retreat. As they grow bolder, the jihadists have struck as far north as Puntland, whilst at the same time Mogadishu is wracked with bombings. 

If they can regain control of Kismayo, it would likely ensure the war continues for some years yet. And there are other challenges facing Farmajo: a worsening famine, lingering clan conflicts and a fragmented administration. To win, he will have to get the clans on his side and create an effective and motivated fighting force. With international support it is possible, but he faces a long road ahead.

Kenya’s slippery slope towards authoritarianism

With a contested election followed by repressive actions against civil society, are we witnessing the first major signs of an authoritarian Kenya?

These past two weeks in August, Kenya has dominated headlines coming out of Africa for two major reasons. One: the general election, which saw a tense few days, with accusations of rigging and fraud loudly versed by the opposition, but with a result that saw the incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta emerge victorious. Two: Almost immediately after the result was announced, a move by the ruling government to dismantle two of Kenya’s leading and most active civil organisations, the Africa Centre for Open Governance (AfriCOG) and the Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KHRC).

What is crucial in understanding both of these headlines is the speed with which the second came after the first and what that might mean for Kenya’s future. With regard to Kenyatta’s election win, it is hard to make any real judgement based on what evidence we have. 

The build-up to the election was one fraught with tension that threatened to boil over into violence, such as that which took place in 2007, after elections resulted in post-election violence that killed over 1000 people. And so, the world watched expectantly as Kenyan electoral officials assured the public that vote rigging, under the new electronic system was not possible, even as the body of the electoral board IT chief was found dead with signs of torture. Nevertheless, voters took to the streets in largely peaceful lines to make their voices heard.

The result was one that international observers say was legitimate with few signs of credible fraud. Almost immediately, the opposition claimed to have such evidence and is now seeking to challenge the government victory in the Supreme Court. 

What is crucial is that legal processes are being observed (so far) by the opposition, although this same route brought them only more defeat after the 2013 elections. Whether fraud took place or not, government moves following the election give cause for concern.

The first steps: an end to civil society

Thus, we come to the second headline: the government’s attempt to deregister two leading civil society organisations. Earlier this week, the NGO Coordination Board advised the Directorate of Criminal Investigations to shut down the organisations, freeze their assets and arrest their directors over allegations that they were operating illegally.

The move immediately sparked backlash from civil society and NGOs, Kenyans and the international community. Yesterday, police raided the offices of AfriCOG in a move that was allegedly without legal justification.

The bottom line of such actions is extremely worrying: unlike neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and South Sudan, Kenya has always represented a progressive stance in East Africa. Yes, in more recent years, there have been curbs to press and political freedoms, but nowhere near the scale of say, Burundi and Ethiopia.

Yet this audacious move, so soon after a general election that is still being contested, is perhaps a prediction of what moves the ruling administration may take over the course of the next term of office (should the opposition challenge fail, of course). 

Similar situations in repressive countries usually start with the suppression of civil society and political opposition. Next comes the press. And finally, there is virtually no one left to openly criticise an elected government. From there, it’s a slippery slope in which the word elected usually disappears quickly. And it is nothing new for Kenya, having suffered through over two decades of authoritarian rule by Daniel Arap Moi in the 80’s and 90’s.

For now, these moves have been halted by a judiciary that is showing it can still exercise some power independent of the government. But for how long, no one knows. And whether worse is to come, we can only wait and watch.

The ICC is at the precipice - it is Africa that will decide which way it goes

 As South Africa backs down from its threat to leave the ICC, what does this mean for the future of the Court?

It's been a hard-last year for the International Criminal Court as a coalition of nations, nominally led by South Africa have announced their withdrawal from the court, leaving it on shaky ground. That could all be about change however, as South Africa recently halted all moves to leave, giving the Court some breathing room. But it will have to work hard to shore itself up.

In the 15 years since its inception, 2017 is arguably the most crucial year for the International Criminal Court. It is in this year that its fate will really be decided. Whether that is to continue its mission to gather more states behind the Rome Statute and fight the good fight of international justice, or to fall in with the legacy of the League of Nations, that remains to be seen.

What is clear, is that if it wants to be the former, the Court needs to make a decisive demonstration that it can evolve from only tackling African problems to tackling global ones. It needs to show that it can be a force for global justice. Needless to say, it requires the member states support to do this, but with South Africa now having backed down from their bluff on withdrawing, perhaps we can start to see a shifting attitude in the commitment that states show to the ICC. At the very least, a recommitment is a sign of unity, something that everyone can get behind.

In the hands of Africa

It is interesting that the future of the Court lies in the hands of Africa. Certainly, a mass African exodus would at the least shake the foundations of the court, and at the most, crumble it all together, especially considering that, since its beginnings, it has only prosecuted Africans.

Therein lies the problem. On the one hand, it is easy to see why the ICC goes after African war criminals. The continent is sporadically ravaged by civil war and stability in the last 15 years has been rare. This perpetual state of war that many African nations such as the DRC, Sudan and CAR seem to find themselves in is a breeding ground for those characters that adhere to the perfect stereotype of the war criminal. Furthermore, it is the lack of, or failings of legal infrastructure and transparency, and a malignant problem with corruption that means that many of these states must turn to the ICC to deal with these war criminals. In short, it instigates the perfect environment for the Court’s purposes.

However, on the other hand it is easy to see this from an African perspective. Although Africa has its fair share of brutal war lords who commit crimes against humanity on a daily basis, so does the rest of the world. There are plenty of other conflicts going on in countries that are member states.

But it is not just about the lack of focus on other regional areas of the world. There are other reasons for why some (I'm not only referring to the greedy African dictators who see the ICC's ability to prosecute them as a threat) might feel that the ICC is not for Africa.

African solutions

There is a saying in Africa that is catching on: African solutions for African problems. The problem is not just a court situated in Europe that until recently solely targeted Africa. It is that sometimes the western models of the ICC clash with the culture systems of Africa. From that perspective, it’s easy to see why the proposed Malabo Protocol, which ventures the idea of combining the two current African courts into an African version of the ICC, is popular with some, and not just with the sitting heads of state who, under the current proposal, have immunity from prosecution.

It would provide a court that caters to African needs, customs and culture and provides African justice. Its sole ‘one continent’ jurisdiction would give it the focus to concentrate on African cases, and this, combined with other factors like location (not having to travel to a whole other continent), language and concentration of members might help it to save on costs or increase funding.

In a perfect Africa, the Malabo Protocol, with some tweaking (i.e. removal of the immunity clause), could be a good solution. But, in a perfect Africa, there would be no war criminals. Alas, as it stands, many, including Africans, are skeptical about the effectiveness of an African court. How could it function free of corruption when corruption reigns in so many other sections of African politics? How would it rid itself of the agonising pace that bureaucracy in many parts of Africa seems to move at today? It would certainly be an uphill battle to make a success.

A global perspective

The concept of the ICC is sound, and it has shown itself to be effective in the past. But in the face of its latest challenges, it will need to do everything it can to survive. This includes demonstrating to Africa that it is prepared to see out war criminals in other parts of the world, something it took a step towards doing when it opened a preliminary investigation in Georgia relating to war crimes in the 2008 South Ossetia conflict.

With South Africa stepping back from its campaign to leave the ICC, and taking a few African nations with it, things are looking up. If 2017 goes its way, it can get back to trying to recruit more states to get behind the Rome Statute. But it must be ready to evolve, to look to new horizons and to expand how it can deal with different cases from different cultures all over the world. It must also look to new methods to enforce help from member states, be it for obligations or funding. If it can show that it is setting these goals, then it might just evolve into a global force for justice.