Museveni's big gamble

With the arrest of Tumukunde, a Ugandan presidential hopeful, Museveni is showing that he’ll be following the usual strategy of repression to make sure he stays on for another four years. But could 2021 be the breaking point?

It had barely been two weeks since Lieutenant-General Tumukunde had announced his intention to run for president in the Ugandan general election in 2021. On Thursday 12 March, police, accompanied by officers from the army’s Chieftancy of Military Intelligence (CMI), arrived at his offices in Kololo, Kampala and arrested him on charges of treason.

The state alleges that Tumukunde had been attempting to incite violence and coerce a foreign government into intervening in the Ugandan election. This allegation stems from a recent television interview in which Tumukunde reportedly made ‘treasonous statements’ that were interpreted as inviting Rwanda to interfere.

Tumukunde, once a stalwart and ally to the incumbent President Yoweri Museveni, and a former general and security minister, appears to be the next victim in Museveni’s campaign to be victorious in next year’s elections.

We've been here before

It’s a familiar scene: the build-up to last Ugandan elections featured numerous arrests of contenders, allegations of beatings by the police and the shutting down of campaign rallies. Dr. Kizza Besigye, the main opposition contender in the 2016 elections, was arrested and allegedly beaten by police numerous times. Although there had been a wave of popular enthusiasm that this time, free and fair elections might prevail and that the aging Museveni, who has now ruled Uganda for nearly 34 years, might just lose.

But it was not to be. Museveni was declared the winner in an election that effectively locked out hundreds of thousands of voters in opposition areas, was marred by irregularities and rejected by international observers.

Now Museveni appears to have begun the process once more. Dr. Besigye is hoping to run again in 2021, but has already been detained by police, after being locked down in a hotel before attending a rally with supporters.

An opponent like no other

Another presidential hopeful, Robert Kyagulanyi aka Bobi Wine, a famous Ugandan music artist, has been arrested and charged with treason numerous times and is currently still facing several treason charges, one of which was “for annoying the president”. And his supporters are already paying the consequences for their allegiance to his campaign. A pastor who hosted Wine last year at his house has been arrested - police said that Andrew Muwanguzi had been holding consultative meetings without having notified them.

It is certain that Museveni is attempting to lock down the opposition candidates before they can gather real momentum for next year. He learned a lesson in the run-up to 2016, when Besigye was attracting wide support from across the country. The late attempts by police to reign in Besigye’s support nearly led to major riots. If Museveni can make life hard for the candidates now, he might be hoping that he can force them to reconsider their presidential ambitions.

A risky strategy

It’s a serious gamble though. It would be an understatement to say that Ugandan’s are weary of Museveni, and in Wine, he has an opponent who presents a major challenge to his rule. Such a statement is evidenced by the fact that any move Wine makes is clamped on by the government. For example, they have designated the red beret – the trademark of Wine and his supporters - as military uniform and made it illegal for any civilians to wear it.

Museveni is hoping that his tried and tested tactics of suppression will work again. But with a Ugandan electorate desperate for change, he faces the possibility that such a strategy might electrify the opposition and swell their numbers, allowing for the possibility of protests, civil disobedience and riots. In those circumstances, it is almost certain that Museveni will use the army to attempt to push aside the opposition, and that makes next year’s elections more dangerous than ever.

A house of cards in Somalia

With elections on the horizon, Somalia can’t afford any distractions. And yet, the fracturing relationship between the government and the federal states puts everything the country has worked for at risk. The federal government is calculating that the possible rewards will be worth it. Are they right?

Nearly two weeks ago, a major armed clash took place in the city of Dhusamareeb in the Galmadug region, north-west of Mogadishu. But it wasn’t between the Somali National Army (SNA) and al Shabaab. It was a battle between government troops and the militia forces of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ), a local Sufi group, who has held sway in the region for nearly a decade. The battle raged throughout the city, as well as down the road in the neighbouring town of Guriel, from Thursday 27^th February, through Friday 28^th and into Saturday, until the leader of the group, Sheikh Mohamed Shakir, and most of his militia surrendered.

Target fixed on Jubaland

But this protracted distraction is not an isolated incident. On Monday 2^nd March, heavy fighting broke out in the town of Beled Hawo, near the Kenya-Somalia border, between government forces and Jubaland (one of Somalia’s federal states) security forces. Everyone knew that some kind of conflict between the two was coming: over a fortnight ago, a crisis erupted in the Gedo region in the western part of Jubaland, when SNA troops were deployed to strategic towns in the region, ostensibly with the excuse of protecting Somalia’s border. But the result was a tense standoff with Jubaland regional forces, which are supposedly responsible for security in the region. As such, the FGS move of sending in troops to a semi-autonomous federal state was seen less as reinforcements for security efforts there then as an attempted power grab by the federal government. 

And there is certainly some basis to those accusations: August 2019 saw elections in Jubaland, with the incumbent President Madobe declared the winner, much to the disappointment of the FGS who had been backing their own candidate. As a result, the FGS refused to recognise Madobe. Not long after, they arrested his security minister. Abdirashid ‘Janan’ was held in detention in Mogadishu until he escaped to Mandera, on the Kenyan side of the border, opposite Beled Hawo. The Kenyans, who have troops stationed in Jubaland fighting al Shabaab, have always been supportive of Madobe and his Jubaland administration much to the annoyance of the FGS, who see the Kenyans as meddling in domestic politics.  While the FGS raged about Janan’s escape, demanding he be returned and mobilising troops to go to Gedo, Janan, on the Kenyan side of the border, was coordinating the assembling of Jubaland state forces, which began to coalesce near Beled-Hawo. The stage was set.

Both sides blamed each other for firing the first shot, but the result was a protracted battle that threatened to spill over onto the Kenyan side of the border. The end of a heavy day’s fighting saw a retreat into Mandera by the Jubaland troops. The fact that they were allowed to cross and be hosted by the Kenyan forces there is a sure sign of support.

The advantages for al Shabaab

And yet, whilst this is all going on, al Shabaab are gleefully rubbing their hands, knowing that such distractions by the FGS and by the federal states, gives them the opportunity to continue their attacks and retake lost ground. The diversion of troops for engagements against ASWJ and Jubaland forces distract from the much greater threat that the militants pose to the stability of Somalia.

It’s a situation that has caused major frustration with international partners involved in the campaign to defeat al Shabaab and bring stability to Somalia. Last week, the US released a statement condemning the deployment of government troops to Gedo, saying that it “diverts resources from the agreed roadmap for security operations”. They followed this up with another statement this week condemning the fighting in Beled-Hawo, pleading for the different sides to recognise the common enemy.

Meanwhile, there is also the ongoing tension with the semi-autonomous northern province of Puntland, whose administration is at loggerheads with the government in Mogadishu over what they see as an encroachment of the FGS into Puntland’s affairs. So far, there have not been any major military incidents between the two, and the government is likely to tread much more warily with Puntland, certainly a more powerful administration than ASWJ or Jubaland.

Farmajo's big gameplan

All of this is partially the result of what many see as a power grab by Somalia’s President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed ‘Farmajo’. He has been pushing his own candidates in regional elections, hoping to have figures installed all across the country that will be loyal to him and the FGS. The recent elections for president in Galmudug state are a clear case: the FGS candidate was declared the winner, while opposition parties, including the previously mentioned ASWJ, boycotted the election, and declared their own candidates as having won. That episode sowed the seed for last week’s fighting in Dhusamareeb.

And yet, for Farmajo, it is all a calculated risk. Yes, he diverts much needed resources away from al Shabaab. Yes, he risks creating greater instability in Somalia by fracturing the states away from Mogadishu. But he sees the possible rewards as outweighing those risks. By successfully defeating regional forces he achieves three things: firstly, he develops the SNA, testing the new Turkish and UAE trained battalions and building their reputations. And if they win, those militias that they defeat become integrated into the SNA. Secondly, by ridding Somalia of regionals forces, he unifies the army and places security responsibilities into the hands of government forces, no matter where they are in the country. Thirdly, he develops a bold reputation for standing up to local militias, gains more influence in each state and therefore creates an image of someone who is determined to unify the country under a single government, a powerful statement for any future election.

Worth the risk?

Amid all of this are the looming general elections set for the end of this year and the beginning of 2021. This year there are plans to implement a one person, one vote policy. The challenges to such an idea are immense, considering the lack of key electoral functions in much of the country. And that’s before you even consider how such a policy would work in an environment in which al Shabaab exists. The militants still control large areas in southern regions like Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba. How the enforcement of universal suffrage in these areas would happen, when the SNA and their allies, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), have so far struggled to penetrate, let alone actually liberate the regions, is another question.

Many analysts are already predicting that these elections won’t happen this year, or even next year, and if they do, they will not be ‘one person, one vote’. Perhaps it is too early for such a mechanism to be installed and there are greater challenges like al Shabaab that need to be dealt with first before any attempt at such a grand scheme. The danger now is if Farmajo’s strategy stalls. A failed attempt at unifying the country under his leadership could result in a more divided Somalia, as federal states push back, possibly allowing an environment in which al Shabaab can attempt a resurgence, and undoing years of progress. However, if he is successful, than perhaps Somalia may find itself, for the first time in decades, united behind a single government with an integrated security force that can take on al Shabaab and secure the country.