A house of cards in Somalia

With elections on the horizon, Somalia can’t afford any distractions. And yet, the fracturing relationship between the government and the federal states puts everything the country has worked for at risk. The federal government is calculating that the possible rewards will be worth it. Are they right?

Nearly two weeks ago, a major armed clash took place in the city of Dhusamareeb in the Galmadug region, north-west of Mogadishu. But it wasn’t between the Somali National Army (SNA) and al Shabaab. It was a battle between government troops and the militia forces of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ), a local Sufi group, who has held sway in the region for nearly a decade. The battle raged throughout the city, as well as down the road in the neighbouring town of Guriel, from Thursday 27^th February, through Friday 28^th and into Saturday, until the leader of the group, Sheikh Mohamed Shakir, and most of his militia surrendered.

Target fixed on Jubaland

But this protracted distraction is not an isolated incident. On Monday 2^nd March, heavy fighting broke out in the town of Beled Hawo, near the Kenya-Somalia border, between government forces and Jubaland (one of Somalia’s federal states) security forces. Everyone knew that some kind of conflict between the two was coming: over a fortnight ago, a crisis erupted in the Gedo region in the western part of Jubaland, when SNA troops were deployed to strategic towns in the region, ostensibly with the excuse of protecting Somalia’s border. But the result was a tense standoff with Jubaland regional forces, which are supposedly responsible for security in the region. As such, the FGS move of sending in troops to a semi-autonomous federal state was seen less as reinforcements for security efforts there then as an attempted power grab by the federal government. 

And there is certainly some basis to those accusations: August 2019 saw elections in Jubaland, with the incumbent President Madobe declared the winner, much to the disappointment of the FGS who had been backing their own candidate. As a result, the FGS refused to recognise Madobe. Not long after, they arrested his security minister. Abdirashid ‘Janan’ was held in detention in Mogadishu until he escaped to Mandera, on the Kenyan side of the border, opposite Beled Hawo. The Kenyans, who have troops stationed in Jubaland fighting al Shabaab, have always been supportive of Madobe and his Jubaland administration much to the annoyance of the FGS, who see the Kenyans as meddling in domestic politics.  While the FGS raged about Janan’s escape, demanding he be returned and mobilising troops to go to Gedo, Janan, on the Kenyan side of the border, was coordinating the assembling of Jubaland state forces, which began to coalesce near Beled-Hawo. The stage was set.

Both sides blamed each other for firing the first shot, but the result was a protracted battle that threatened to spill over onto the Kenyan side of the border. The end of a heavy day’s fighting saw a retreat into Mandera by the Jubaland troops. The fact that they were allowed to cross and be hosted by the Kenyan forces there is a sure sign of support.

The advantages for al Shabaab

And yet, whilst this is all going on, al Shabaab are gleefully rubbing their hands, knowing that such distractions by the FGS and by the federal states, gives them the opportunity to continue their attacks and retake lost ground. The diversion of troops for engagements against ASWJ and Jubaland forces distract from the much greater threat that the militants pose to the stability of Somalia.

It’s a situation that has caused major frustration with international partners involved in the campaign to defeat al Shabaab and bring stability to Somalia. Last week, the US released a statement condemning the deployment of government troops to Gedo, saying that it “diverts resources from the agreed roadmap for security operations”. They followed this up with another statement this week condemning the fighting in Beled-Hawo, pleading for the different sides to recognise the common enemy.

Meanwhile, there is also the ongoing tension with the semi-autonomous northern province of Puntland, whose administration is at loggerheads with the government in Mogadishu over what they see as an encroachment of the FGS into Puntland’s affairs. So far, there have not been any major military incidents between the two, and the government is likely to tread much more warily with Puntland, certainly a more powerful administration than ASWJ or Jubaland.

Farmajo's big gameplan

All of this is partially the result of what many see as a power grab by Somalia’s President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed ‘Farmajo’. He has been pushing his own candidates in regional elections, hoping to have figures installed all across the country that will be loyal to him and the FGS. The recent elections for president in Galmudug state are a clear case: the FGS candidate was declared the winner, while opposition parties, including the previously mentioned ASWJ, boycotted the election, and declared their own candidates as having won. That episode sowed the seed for last week’s fighting in Dhusamareeb.

And yet, for Farmajo, it is all a calculated risk. Yes, he diverts much needed resources away from al Shabaab. Yes, he risks creating greater instability in Somalia by fracturing the states away from Mogadishu. But he sees the possible rewards as outweighing those risks. By successfully defeating regional forces he achieves three things: firstly, he develops the SNA, testing the new Turkish and UAE trained battalions and building their reputations. And if they win, those militias that they defeat become integrated into the SNA. Secondly, by ridding Somalia of regionals forces, he unifies the army and places security responsibilities into the hands of government forces, no matter where they are in the country. Thirdly, he develops a bold reputation for standing up to local militias, gains more influence in each state and therefore creates an image of someone who is determined to unify the country under a single government, a powerful statement for any future election.

Worth the risk?

Amid all of this are the looming general elections set for the end of this year and the beginning of 2021. This year there are plans to implement a one person, one vote policy. The challenges to such an idea are immense, considering the lack of key electoral functions in much of the country. And that’s before you even consider how such a policy would work in an environment in which al Shabaab exists. The militants still control large areas in southern regions like Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba. How the enforcement of universal suffrage in these areas would happen, when the SNA and their allies, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), have so far struggled to penetrate, let alone actually liberate the regions, is another question.

Many analysts are already predicting that these elections won’t happen this year, or even next year, and if they do, they will not be ‘one person, one vote’. Perhaps it is too early for such a mechanism to be installed and there are greater challenges like al Shabaab that need to be dealt with first before any attempt at such a grand scheme. The danger now is if Farmajo’s strategy stalls. A failed attempt at unifying the country under his leadership could result in a more divided Somalia, as federal states push back, possibly allowing an environment in which al Shabaab can attempt a resurgence, and undoing years of progress. However, if he is successful, than perhaps Somalia may find itself, for the first time in decades, united behind a single government with an integrated security force that can take on al Shabaab and secure the country.