The US changes PR tack in Somalia

The US just admitted that they killed two civilians in an air strike in Somalia. The acknowledgement is a huge shift in strategy from the usual silence. So, how will it shape their ongoing air campaign against al Shabaab?

This week, the US did something I thought they would never do. US Africa Command openly admitted that an air strike, conducted on 23 February near Kunyo Barrow in Somalia, killed two civilians and injured three others. They added, as if to make up for this, that the strike had also killed the three intended targets - al Shabaab operatives.

The announcement took me by surprise because, from a strategic point of view for the US, an acknowledgement like this is sure to cause their overall strategy more harm than good.

A history of silence

In the 12 or so years that the US has been conducting air strikes against al Shabaab in Somalia, they have only once admitted that civilians had been killed in a particular strike, despite dozens of accusations having been made throughout these years. That particular incident followed an Amnesty International report, which said it could show that two civilians had been killed by a US air strike on 1 April 2018. A year later, AFRICOM said Amnesty was correct: two civilians had died.

But this was the exception rather than the rule. In the last two years alone, the accusations have continued to grow and in response, AFRICOM has remained largely quiet. In February 2020, the air strike monitoring group, Air Wars, released their own data, which they said showed that the US had been massively underreporting civilian casualties. The Intercept followed this up with their own investigation, which presented more evidence that civilians were being targeted. In early March, an airstrike, which AFRICOM said had targeted four militants, was condemned by residents and a local lawmaker as having killed five civilians in a minibus. Still, AFRICOM followed their tried-and-tested strategy of silence.

A change in direction

Then, on 31 March, AFRICOM suddenly announced the launch of the Civilian Casualties Status Report Initiative (CCSRI), which would increase transparency by showcasing the findings of internal investigations into civilian casualties, as well as how those investigations are conducted. This would result in a quarterly report, which would lay bare all that the Americans had found.

So, why the change in strategy? Well, it is clear that silence was just not effective. Amid the increasing accusations, silence only equalled guilt. Each accusation that went unaddressed added to suspicion and provided continuing opportunities for al Shabaab to capitalise in their ongoing propaganda war. On top of this, the US air campaign has been increasing dramatically and looks set to continue to do so: in 2019, the US launched 64 strikes, while in the first four months of 2020, they have already launched nearly 40, well on track to set a new record, with eight months still to go. But with increasing strikes comes the increased risk of civilian casualties in those strikes.

Thus, the launch of a PR strategy that would allow AFRICOM to address the allegations, attempt to project some form of transparency and hopefully seize control of the negative narrative that has worked against them. It seemed like a good idea, especially as it would provide something to fall back on if and when more accusations surface in the future. However, it appeared unlikely that this initiative would result in AFRICOM acknowledging the possibility that civilians may have been targeted, at least, any more than it had already done in the past.

At best, AFRICOM might perhaps reveal the launch of investigation, acknowledging the possibility of claims and pay lip service to the goal of transparency. But admit that some of those claims are true? Such a revelation would play right into al Shabaab’s effective propaganda machine, presenting a moral victory to the militants that might result in greater support for them, whilst weakening the argument that the US air campaign is an effective method to win this war.

A genuine attempt at transparency?

Imagine my surprise when this is exactly what AFRICOM did. The first of these quarterly reports was released on 27 April and contained an acknowledgement of the civilians killed in the 23 February strike, stating that “we will admit the mistake”, and adding an apology to the government and people of Somalia. The report also contained 20 incidents of closed investigations that found no evidence of civilian casualties, as well as seven ongoing investigations.

Almost immediately, social media was ignited, with many individuals accusing the US of killing innocent Somalis and requesting their government cease the partnership. Al Shabaab has yet to release a full statement, but when it comes, it will be sure to use this opportunity to the full extent.

The question, therefore, is: knowing now that this new US strategy is at least partly genuine in its promise to investigate and reveal incidents of civilian casualties, how will it affect their war against al Shabaab?

Perhaps AFRICOM is banking on the fact that one revelation here and there will lend credence to the negative findings of investigations into dozens of other incidents. It must be said that amongst the backlash of criticism following this week’s revelation, was some lauding of the report by both civil society and media, praising some transparency at last.

Or perhaps AFRICOM is attempting to be totally genuine with the new strategy, adopting a completely transparent approach that it hopes might win it support from the Somali public and present the case for the need for an air campaign to disrupt al Shabaab operations. After all, the new report includes a statement from AFRICOM commander General Stephen Townsend: “There is no secret air or shadow war as some allege. How can there be when the whole world knows we are assisting Somalia in their fight against al-Shabaab terrorists? When we publically announce every single airstrike we conduct? When we publically admit to our mistakes?”

If so, it’s a risky strategy and one with the potential to backfire on US operations in Somalia. We shall have to wait and see.

Museveni's big gamble

With the arrest of Tumukunde, a Ugandan presidential hopeful, Museveni is showing that he’ll be following the usual strategy of repression to make sure he stays on for another four years. But could 2021 be the breaking point?

It had barely been two weeks since Lieutenant-General Tumukunde had announced his intention to run for president in the Ugandan general election in 2021. On Thursday 12 March, police, accompanied by officers from the army’s Chieftancy of Military Intelligence (CMI), arrived at his offices in Kololo, Kampala and arrested him on charges of treason.

The state alleges that Tumukunde had been attempting to incite violence and coerce a foreign government into intervening in the Ugandan election. This allegation stems from a recent television interview in which Tumukunde reportedly made ‘treasonous statements’ that were interpreted as inviting Rwanda to interfere.

Tumukunde, once a stalwart and ally to the incumbent President Yoweri Museveni, and a former general and security minister, appears to be the next victim in Museveni’s campaign to be victorious in next year’s elections.

We've been here before

It’s a familiar scene: the build-up to last Ugandan elections featured numerous arrests of contenders, allegations of beatings by the police and the shutting down of campaign rallies. Dr. Kizza Besigye, the main opposition contender in the 2016 elections, was arrested and allegedly beaten by police numerous times. Although there had been a wave of popular enthusiasm that this time, free and fair elections might prevail and that the aging Museveni, who has now ruled Uganda for nearly 34 years, might just lose.

But it was not to be. Museveni was declared the winner in an election that effectively locked out hundreds of thousands of voters in opposition areas, was marred by irregularities and rejected by international observers.

Now Museveni appears to have begun the process once more. Dr. Besigye is hoping to run again in 2021, but has already been detained by police, after being locked down in a hotel before attending a rally with supporters.

An opponent like no other

Another presidential hopeful, Robert Kyagulanyi aka Bobi Wine, a famous Ugandan music artist, has been arrested and charged with treason numerous times and is currently still facing several treason charges, one of which was “for annoying the president”. And his supporters are already paying the consequences for their allegiance to his campaign. A pastor who hosted Wine last year at his house has been arrested - police said that Andrew Muwanguzi had been holding consultative meetings without having notified them.

It is certain that Museveni is attempting to lock down the opposition candidates before they can gather real momentum for next year. He learned a lesson in the run-up to 2016, when Besigye was attracting wide support from across the country. The late attempts by police to reign in Besigye’s support nearly led to major riots. If Museveni can make life hard for the candidates now, he might be hoping that he can force them to reconsider their presidential ambitions.

A risky strategy

It’s a serious gamble though. It would be an understatement to say that Ugandan’s are weary of Museveni, and in Wine, he has an opponent who presents a major challenge to his rule. Such a statement is evidenced by the fact that any move Wine makes is clamped on by the government. For example, they have designated the red beret – the trademark of Wine and his supporters - as military uniform and made it illegal for any civilians to wear it.

Museveni is hoping that his tried and tested tactics of suppression will work again. But with a Ugandan electorate desperate for change, he faces the possibility that such a strategy might electrify the opposition and swell their numbers, allowing for the possibility of protests, civil disobedience and riots. In those circumstances, it is almost certain that Museveni will use the army to attempt to push aside the opposition, and that makes next year’s elections more dangerous than ever.

A house of cards in Somalia

With elections on the horizon, Somalia can’t afford any distractions. And yet, the fracturing relationship between the government and the federal states puts everything the country has worked for at risk. The federal government is calculating that the possible rewards will be worth it. Are they right?

Nearly two weeks ago, a major armed clash took place in the city of Dhusamareeb in the Galmadug region, north-west of Mogadishu. But it wasn’t between the Somali National Army (SNA) and al Shabaab. It was a battle between government troops and the militia forces of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ), a local Sufi group, who has held sway in the region for nearly a decade. The battle raged throughout the city, as well as down the road in the neighbouring town of Guriel, from Thursday 27^th February, through Friday 28^th and into Saturday, until the leader of the group, Sheikh Mohamed Shakir, and most of his militia surrendered.

Target fixed on Jubaland

But this protracted distraction is not an isolated incident. On Monday 2^nd March, heavy fighting broke out in the town of Beled Hawo, near the Kenya-Somalia border, between government forces and Jubaland (one of Somalia’s federal states) security forces. Everyone knew that some kind of conflict between the two was coming: over a fortnight ago, a crisis erupted in the Gedo region in the western part of Jubaland, when SNA troops were deployed to strategic towns in the region, ostensibly with the excuse of protecting Somalia’s border. But the result was a tense standoff with Jubaland regional forces, which are supposedly responsible for security in the region. As such, the FGS move of sending in troops to a semi-autonomous federal state was seen less as reinforcements for security efforts there then as an attempted power grab by the federal government. 

And there is certainly some basis to those accusations: August 2019 saw elections in Jubaland, with the incumbent President Madobe declared the winner, much to the disappointment of the FGS who had been backing their own candidate. As a result, the FGS refused to recognise Madobe. Not long after, they arrested his security minister. Abdirashid ‘Janan’ was held in detention in Mogadishu until he escaped to Mandera, on the Kenyan side of the border, opposite Beled Hawo. The Kenyans, who have troops stationed in Jubaland fighting al Shabaab, have always been supportive of Madobe and his Jubaland administration much to the annoyance of the FGS, who see the Kenyans as meddling in domestic politics.  While the FGS raged about Janan’s escape, demanding he be returned and mobilising troops to go to Gedo, Janan, on the Kenyan side of the border, was coordinating the assembling of Jubaland state forces, which began to coalesce near Beled-Hawo. The stage was set.

Both sides blamed each other for firing the first shot, but the result was a protracted battle that threatened to spill over onto the Kenyan side of the border. The end of a heavy day’s fighting saw a retreat into Mandera by the Jubaland troops. The fact that they were allowed to cross and be hosted by the Kenyan forces there is a sure sign of support.

The advantages for al Shabaab

And yet, whilst this is all going on, al Shabaab are gleefully rubbing their hands, knowing that such distractions by the FGS and by the federal states, gives them the opportunity to continue their attacks and retake lost ground. The diversion of troops for engagements against ASWJ and Jubaland forces distract from the much greater threat that the militants pose to the stability of Somalia.

It’s a situation that has caused major frustration with international partners involved in the campaign to defeat al Shabaab and bring stability to Somalia. Last week, the US released a statement condemning the deployment of government troops to Gedo, saying that it “diverts resources from the agreed roadmap for security operations”. They followed this up with another statement this week condemning the fighting in Beled-Hawo, pleading for the different sides to recognise the common enemy.

Meanwhile, there is also the ongoing tension with the semi-autonomous northern province of Puntland, whose administration is at loggerheads with the government in Mogadishu over what they see as an encroachment of the FGS into Puntland’s affairs. So far, there have not been any major military incidents between the two, and the government is likely to tread much more warily with Puntland, certainly a more powerful administration than ASWJ or Jubaland.

Farmajo's big gameplan

All of this is partially the result of what many see as a power grab by Somalia’s President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed ‘Farmajo’. He has been pushing his own candidates in regional elections, hoping to have figures installed all across the country that will be loyal to him and the FGS. The recent elections for president in Galmudug state are a clear case: the FGS candidate was declared the winner, while opposition parties, including the previously mentioned ASWJ, boycotted the election, and declared their own candidates as having won. That episode sowed the seed for last week’s fighting in Dhusamareeb.

And yet, for Farmajo, it is all a calculated risk. Yes, he diverts much needed resources away from al Shabaab. Yes, he risks creating greater instability in Somalia by fracturing the states away from Mogadishu. But he sees the possible rewards as outweighing those risks. By successfully defeating regional forces he achieves three things: firstly, he develops the SNA, testing the new Turkish and UAE trained battalions and building their reputations. And if they win, those militias that they defeat become integrated into the SNA. Secondly, by ridding Somalia of regionals forces, he unifies the army and places security responsibilities into the hands of government forces, no matter where they are in the country. Thirdly, he develops a bold reputation for standing up to local militias, gains more influence in each state and therefore creates an image of someone who is determined to unify the country under a single government, a powerful statement for any future election.

Worth the risk?

Amid all of this are the looming general elections set for the end of this year and the beginning of 2021. This year there are plans to implement a one person, one vote policy. The challenges to such an idea are immense, considering the lack of key electoral functions in much of the country. And that’s before you even consider how such a policy would work in an environment in which al Shabaab exists. The militants still control large areas in southern regions like Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba. How the enforcement of universal suffrage in these areas would happen, when the SNA and their allies, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), have so far struggled to penetrate, let alone actually liberate the regions, is another question.

Many analysts are already predicting that these elections won’t happen this year, or even next year, and if they do, they will not be ‘one person, one vote’. Perhaps it is too early for such a mechanism to be installed and there are greater challenges like al Shabaab that need to be dealt with first before any attempt at such a grand scheme. The danger now is if Farmajo’s strategy stalls. A failed attempt at unifying the country under his leadership could result in a more divided Somalia, as federal states push back, possibly allowing an environment in which al Shabaab can attempt a resurgence, and undoing years of progress. However, if he is successful, than perhaps Somalia may find itself, for the first time in decades, united behind a single government with an integrated security force that can take on al Shabaab and secure the country.

A déjà vu moment in Malawi’s High Court verdict

Yes, Malawians must celebrate the momentous decision their High Court just made. But they must be wary too, as we’ve seen this play out very differently before.

It’s a big moment in Africa and one that is, unfortunately, rarely seen. Malawi’s high court has annulled the results of last year’s presidential election, citing irregularities and ordered that a new vote be held within the next 150 days.

It’s a big moment because, in a continent where the institutions of democracy are consistently characterised as weak, Malawi’s High Court judges have pronounced an independent ruling that is damaging to their president.

And so, the celebrations begin! One need only visit social media to understand the jubilations. One twitter user posted a photo of the judges with the caption ‘The true sons and daughters of Malawi, our nation treasure, we are all so proud of you.’ Another wrote, ‘As Malawians we must be grateful to our democracy! In a special way we must recognize our 5 judges as heroes.’

A brave but just decision

And it’s true. The evidence that there were problems with the reporting of the 2019 election is overwhelming - in some cases, the ballot forms were blatantly marked and changed with tippex and marker pen. What’s more, the judges arrived at the High Court to pronounce their verdict in military vehicles, chaperoned by government soldiers, in what many believed was a sign that the verdict would sway in the president’s favour.

The reaction from Malawi says it all: Videos of soldiers dancing with protestors on the streets, in a throwback to the scenes in Harare after Robert Mugabe was forced to step down. Malawians understand the significance of what their High Court has just pronounced.

So, yes, the judges are heroes for delivering a verdict that represents independence and democracy. And yes, Malawians and Africans should be proud.

We've seen this before somewhere

But as I’m writing this, I’m feeling a sense of déjà vu mingled in with the elation, and I suddenly realise why. We’ve been here before. This same situation, except that it wasn’t in Malawi, it was in Kenya.

In August 2017, incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta was declared the winner of the Kenyan general election with 54% of the vote. It was a victory that was mired in controversy: the head of information, communication and technology at the electoral commission, the man who developed the new voting system, was found dead just days before the election, with physical signs of torture on his body; EU observers expressed concern about the high number of spoilt ballots; and the opposition alleged that the results had been tampered with.

The opposition leader, Raila Odinga, challenged the result in the Supreme Court. He had made the same move in 2013, after losing in that election, and no one was surprised when the court upheld the initial result in favour of Kenyatta. The move was highly criticized at home and abroad for both the handling of the case and the judgment.

Yet Odinga tried again in 2017. And on 1^st September, the Supreme Court judges filed in and delivered a verdict that shocked the continent: They declared the election null and void and ordered a fresh election.

It was a momentous day, and one to be celebrated as an act of integrity and independence from a judiciary too often in the pocket of the executive.

An unhappy ending

But what happened next marred the entire episode. No changes were made to the board of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC); no reforms were instituted in the systems or personnel of the IEBC; a resigned IEBC commissioner, who fled to the US, declared that the new vote would not be fair; the chairman of the IEBC also expressed concerns that the vote may have issues.

And so, Raila and the opposition parties refused to participate, resulting in the re-election of Kenyatta with 98% of the vote but a 39% turnout, less than half of the turnout from August’s vote.

Questions must be asked and answered

I relate this story only to say that yes, we can be jubilant with the decision in Malawi. But we must be wary too. The High Court verdict is only the first step towards truly democratic elections. Questions must be asked: how was such blatant tampering allowed in the first place? Will Malawi need an entirely new body to oversee the election? Why didn’t election observers speak up more? Most importantly, what are the major changes that need to happen for history to not repeat itself?

If those questions can be satisfactorily answered, then Malawi will not only have exercised true rule of law in one institution, but will have set the tone for democracy throughout many others as well and shown the rest of the continent that true democratic elections are no mere fantasy.

The Camp Simba Strike: Implications for US policy in the Horn

Just as the US is looking to draw down it’s presence in Africa, al-Shabaab has made a bold attack that has left three Americans dead. So, what will be the effect on US security policy in the Horn of Africa?

On Sunday 5 January, just before dawn, militants from the Somalia-based terror group, al-Shabaab, launched an attack on Camp Simba, a shared US and Kenyan military base on the island of Manda near Lamu. After breaching the fence and allegedly destroying several military vehicles and aircraft, Kenyan troops managed to repulse the attack but not after several Kenyan soldiers and three US personnel, two contractors and one serving member, were killed.

It’s the first major attack against a US position in Kenya and therefore represents a significant escalation of activity, possibly a sign that al-Shabaab is entering an even more aggressive phase of their campaign. The last US casualty in Somalia was a Special Forces soldier killed in 2018 whilst assisting an African Union (AU) tactical mission in Somalia. Although that would have been a significant moment for the group, it was not the result of a highly planned operation such as this. This attack shows a coordinated effort to directly target US forces.

US drawdown in Africa

The audacious assault comes less than a month after The Pentagon announced the possibility of a major drawdown or even complete pullout of US military personnel throughout Africa (although that would focus more heavily on West Africa).

With Trump’s ‘America First’ policy and his insistence that the US take a back seat in ‘global policing’, the crucial US support in Somalia hangs in the balance. AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) troops are heavily reliant on both US Special Forces training and on key air support from US drones and aircraft. Without that support, it is likely that the AU’s attempt to contain al-Shabaab will falter.

The position of the AU

The AMISOM presence itself was supposed to end in 2019 but was extended for one year to support stability before Somali elections in 2020. Whether it will be extended again remains to be seen, but with the possibility of AU troop withdrawals and a US drawdown on men and equipment, the likelihood for a major al-Shabaab resurgence in 2020 has increased.

Then there is also the geopolitical competition in the region to consider. Nations such as the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, China and others are jostling for influence in the crucial area that overlooks shipping through the Red Sea. A US withdrawal would leave a vacuum in support for the Somali government in their struggle against al-Shabaab and a rise in influence in the region for whoever should step in to provide it.

A US response

However, the death of the US personnel as a result of a direct attack could also mark a small but crucial marker in the US fight against al-Shabaab. There is a possibility that this loss will drive many in the Pentagon to seek a bolstering of their presence in the Horn, both to counter the insurgents and to fend off any rivalry from the other players.

The real question is: will an erratic and unpredictable commander-in-chief in the form of Trump be swayed by his generals on the one hand or the ghosts of Afghanistan and the infamous Battle for Mogadishu in 1993 (in which 18 Americans were killed) on the other.

The beginnings of a new strategy

In the meantime, the Camp Simba attack is being touted as a victory by al- Shabaab and in the aftermath, US reaction is crucial. What is certain is that 2020, with Somali elections, a possible US drawdown, the end of the AU mission and the increasing jostling of foreign powers, will be a hugely important year for al-Shabaab’s strategy. Perhaps we have just seen the first step in it.