A house of cards in Somalia

With elections on the horizon, Somalia can’t afford any distractions. And yet, the fracturing relationship between the government and the federal states puts everything the country has worked for at risk. The federal government is calculating that the possible rewards will be worth it. Are they right?

Nearly two weeks ago, a major armed clash took place in the city of Dhusamareeb in the Galmadug region, north-west of Mogadishu. But it wasn’t between the Somali National Army (SNA) and al Shabaab. It was a battle between government troops and the militia forces of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ), a local Sufi group, who has held sway in the region for nearly a decade. The battle raged throughout the city, as well as down the road in the neighbouring town of Guriel, from Thursday 27^th February, through Friday 28^th and into Saturday, until the leader of the group, Sheikh Mohamed Shakir, and most of his militia surrendered.

Target fixed on Jubaland

But this protracted distraction is not an isolated incident. On Monday 2^nd March, heavy fighting broke out in the town of Beled Hawo, near the Kenya-Somalia border, between government forces and Jubaland (one of Somalia’s federal states) security forces. Everyone knew that some kind of conflict between the two was coming: over a fortnight ago, a crisis erupted in the Gedo region in the western part of Jubaland, when SNA troops were deployed to strategic towns in the region, ostensibly with the excuse of protecting Somalia’s border. But the result was a tense standoff with Jubaland regional forces, which are supposedly responsible for security in the region. As such, the FGS move of sending in troops to a semi-autonomous federal state was seen less as reinforcements for security efforts there then as an attempted power grab by the federal government. 

And there is certainly some basis to those accusations: August 2019 saw elections in Jubaland, with the incumbent President Madobe declared the winner, much to the disappointment of the FGS who had been backing their own candidate. As a result, the FGS refused to recognise Madobe. Not long after, they arrested his security minister. Abdirashid ‘Janan’ was held in detention in Mogadishu until he escaped to Mandera, on the Kenyan side of the border, opposite Beled Hawo. The Kenyans, who have troops stationed in Jubaland fighting al Shabaab, have always been supportive of Madobe and his Jubaland administration much to the annoyance of the FGS, who see the Kenyans as meddling in domestic politics.  While the FGS raged about Janan’s escape, demanding he be returned and mobilising troops to go to Gedo, Janan, on the Kenyan side of the border, was coordinating the assembling of Jubaland state forces, which began to coalesce near Beled-Hawo. The stage was set.

Both sides blamed each other for firing the first shot, but the result was a protracted battle that threatened to spill over onto the Kenyan side of the border. The end of a heavy day’s fighting saw a retreat into Mandera by the Jubaland troops. The fact that they were allowed to cross and be hosted by the Kenyan forces there is a sure sign of support.

The advantages for al Shabaab

And yet, whilst this is all going on, al Shabaab are gleefully rubbing their hands, knowing that such distractions by the FGS and by the federal states, gives them the opportunity to continue their attacks and retake lost ground. The diversion of troops for engagements against ASWJ and Jubaland forces distract from the much greater threat that the militants pose to the stability of Somalia.

It’s a situation that has caused major frustration with international partners involved in the campaign to defeat al Shabaab and bring stability to Somalia. Last week, the US released a statement condemning the deployment of government troops to Gedo, saying that it “diverts resources from the agreed roadmap for security operations”. They followed this up with another statement this week condemning the fighting in Beled-Hawo, pleading for the different sides to recognise the common enemy.

Meanwhile, there is also the ongoing tension with the semi-autonomous northern province of Puntland, whose administration is at loggerheads with the government in Mogadishu over what they see as an encroachment of the FGS into Puntland’s affairs. So far, there have not been any major military incidents between the two, and the government is likely to tread much more warily with Puntland, certainly a more powerful administration than ASWJ or Jubaland.

Farmajo's big gameplan

All of this is partially the result of what many see as a power grab by Somalia’s President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed ‘Farmajo’. He has been pushing his own candidates in regional elections, hoping to have figures installed all across the country that will be loyal to him and the FGS. The recent elections for president in Galmudug state are a clear case: the FGS candidate was declared the winner, while opposition parties, including the previously mentioned ASWJ, boycotted the election, and declared their own candidates as having won. That episode sowed the seed for last week’s fighting in Dhusamareeb.

And yet, for Farmajo, it is all a calculated risk. Yes, he diverts much needed resources away from al Shabaab. Yes, he risks creating greater instability in Somalia by fracturing the states away from Mogadishu. But he sees the possible rewards as outweighing those risks. By successfully defeating regional forces he achieves three things: firstly, he develops the SNA, testing the new Turkish and UAE trained battalions and building their reputations. And if they win, those militias that they defeat become integrated into the SNA. Secondly, by ridding Somalia of regionals forces, he unifies the army and places security responsibilities into the hands of government forces, no matter where they are in the country. Thirdly, he develops a bold reputation for standing up to local militias, gains more influence in each state and therefore creates an image of someone who is determined to unify the country under a single government, a powerful statement for any future election.

Worth the risk?

Amid all of this are the looming general elections set for the end of this year and the beginning of 2021. This year there are plans to implement a one person, one vote policy. The challenges to such an idea are immense, considering the lack of key electoral functions in much of the country. And that’s before you even consider how such a policy would work in an environment in which al Shabaab exists. The militants still control large areas in southern regions like Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba. How the enforcement of universal suffrage in these areas would happen, when the SNA and their allies, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), have so far struggled to penetrate, let alone actually liberate the regions, is another question.

Many analysts are already predicting that these elections won’t happen this year, or even next year, and if they do, they will not be ‘one person, one vote’. Perhaps it is too early for such a mechanism to be installed and there are greater challenges like al Shabaab that need to be dealt with first before any attempt at such a grand scheme. The danger now is if Farmajo’s strategy stalls. A failed attempt at unifying the country under his leadership could result in a more divided Somalia, as federal states push back, possibly allowing an environment in which al Shabaab can attempt a resurgence, and undoing years of progress. However, if he is successful, than perhaps Somalia may find itself, for the first time in decades, united behind a single government with an integrated security force that can take on al Shabaab and secure the country.

A déjà vu moment in Malawi’s High Court verdict

Yes, Malawians must celebrate the momentous decision their High Court just made. But they must be wary too, as we’ve seen this play out very differently before.

It’s a big moment in Africa and one that is, unfortunately, rarely seen. Malawi’s high court has annulled the results of last year’s presidential election, citing irregularities and ordered that a new vote be held within the next 150 days.

It’s a big moment because, in a continent where the institutions of democracy are consistently characterised as weak, Malawi’s High Court judges have pronounced an independent ruling that is damaging to their president.

And so, the celebrations begin! One need only visit social media to understand the jubilations. One twitter user posted a photo of the judges with the caption ‘The true sons and daughters of Malawi, our nation treasure, we are all so proud of you.’ Another wrote, ‘As Malawians we must be grateful to our democracy! In a special way we must recognize our 5 judges as heroes.’

A brave but just decision

And it’s true. The evidence that there were problems with the reporting of the 2019 election is overwhelming - in some cases, the ballot forms were blatantly marked and changed with tippex and marker pen. What’s more, the judges arrived at the High Court to pronounce their verdict in military vehicles, chaperoned by government soldiers, in what many believed was a sign that the verdict would sway in the president’s favour.

The reaction from Malawi says it all: Videos of soldiers dancing with protestors on the streets, in a throwback to the scenes in Harare after Robert Mugabe was forced to step down. Malawians understand the significance of what their High Court has just pronounced.

So, yes, the judges are heroes for delivering a verdict that represents independence and democracy. And yes, Malawians and Africans should be proud.

We've seen this before somewhere

But as I’m writing this, I’m feeling a sense of déjà vu mingled in with the elation, and I suddenly realise why. We’ve been here before. This same situation, except that it wasn’t in Malawi, it was in Kenya.

In August 2017, incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta was declared the winner of the Kenyan general election with 54% of the vote. It was a victory that was mired in controversy: the head of information, communication and technology at the electoral commission, the man who developed the new voting system, was found dead just days before the election, with physical signs of torture on his body; EU observers expressed concern about the high number of spoilt ballots; and the opposition alleged that the results had been tampered with.

The opposition leader, Raila Odinga, challenged the result in the Supreme Court. He had made the same move in 2013, after losing in that election, and no one was surprised when the court upheld the initial result in favour of Kenyatta. The move was highly criticized at home and abroad for both the handling of the case and the judgment.

Yet Odinga tried again in 2017. And on 1^st September, the Supreme Court judges filed in and delivered a verdict that shocked the continent: They declared the election null and void and ordered a fresh election.

It was a momentous day, and one to be celebrated as an act of integrity and independence from a judiciary too often in the pocket of the executive.

An unhappy ending

But what happened next marred the entire episode. No changes were made to the board of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC); no reforms were instituted in the systems or personnel of the IEBC; a resigned IEBC commissioner, who fled to the US, declared that the new vote would not be fair; the chairman of the IEBC also expressed concerns that the vote may have issues.

And so, Raila and the opposition parties refused to participate, resulting in the re-election of Kenyatta with 98% of the vote but a 39% turnout, less than half of the turnout from August’s vote.

Questions must be asked and answered

I relate this story only to say that yes, we can be jubilant with the decision in Malawi. But we must be wary too. The High Court verdict is only the first step towards truly democratic elections. Questions must be asked: how was such blatant tampering allowed in the first place? Will Malawi need an entirely new body to oversee the election? Why didn’t election observers speak up more? Most importantly, what are the major changes that need to happen for history to not repeat itself?

If those questions can be satisfactorily answered, then Malawi will not only have exercised true rule of law in one institution, but will have set the tone for democracy throughout many others as well and shown the rest of the continent that true democratic elections are no mere fantasy.

The Camp Simba Strike: Implications for US policy in the Horn

Just as the US is looking to draw down it’s presence in Africa, al-Shabaab has made a bold attack that has left three Americans dead. So, what will be the effect on US security policy in the Horn of Africa?

On Sunday 5 January, just before dawn, militants from the Somalia-based terror group, al-Shabaab, launched an attack on Camp Simba, a shared US and Kenyan military base on the island of Manda near Lamu. After breaching the fence and allegedly destroying several military vehicles and aircraft, Kenyan troops managed to repulse the attack but not after several Kenyan soldiers and three US personnel, two contractors and one serving member, were killed.

It’s the first major attack against a US position in Kenya and therefore represents a significant escalation of activity, possibly a sign that al-Shabaab is entering an even more aggressive phase of their campaign. The last US casualty in Somalia was a Special Forces soldier killed in 2018 whilst assisting an African Union (AU) tactical mission in Somalia. Although that would have been a significant moment for the group, it was not the result of a highly planned operation such as this. This attack shows a coordinated effort to directly target US forces.

US drawdown in Africa

The audacious assault comes less than a month after The Pentagon announced the possibility of a major drawdown or even complete pullout of US military personnel throughout Africa (although that would focus more heavily on West Africa).

With Trump’s ‘America First’ policy and his insistence that the US take a back seat in ‘global policing’, the crucial US support in Somalia hangs in the balance. AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) troops are heavily reliant on both US Special Forces training and on key air support from US drones and aircraft. Without that support, it is likely that the AU’s attempt to contain al-Shabaab will falter.

The position of the AU

The AMISOM presence itself was supposed to end in 2019 but was extended for one year to support stability before Somali elections in 2020. Whether it will be extended again remains to be seen, but with the possibility of AU troop withdrawals and a US drawdown on men and equipment, the likelihood for a major al-Shabaab resurgence in 2020 has increased.

Then there is also the geopolitical competition in the region to consider. Nations such as the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, China and others are jostling for influence in the crucial area that overlooks shipping through the Red Sea. A US withdrawal would leave a vacuum in support for the Somali government in their struggle against al-Shabaab and a rise in influence in the region for whoever should step in to provide it.

A US response

However, the death of the US personnel as a result of a direct attack could also mark a small but crucial marker in the US fight against al-Shabaab. There is a possibility that this loss will drive many in the Pentagon to seek a bolstering of their presence in the Horn, both to counter the insurgents and to fend off any rivalry from the other players.

The real question is: will an erratic and unpredictable commander-in-chief in the form of Trump be swayed by his generals on the one hand or the ghosts of Afghanistan and the infamous Battle for Mogadishu in 1993 (in which 18 Americans were killed) on the other.

The beginnings of a new strategy

In the meantime, the Camp Simba attack is being touted as a victory by al- Shabaab and in the aftermath, US reaction is crucial. What is certain is that 2020, with Somali elections, a possible US drawdown, the end of the AU mission and the increasing jostling of foreign powers, will be a hugely important year for al-Shabaab’s strategy. Perhaps we have just seen the first step in it.

Ethiopia & Eritrea's shot at peace: fulfilling or futile?

After twenty years of closed borders, hostility and separated families, the ice has melted, and relations have normalised. But will these two nations be able to make this work or have other factors doomed peace before it has even begun?

The war

For some context, the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border War lasted from 1998 to 2000, costing some 100,000 lives, both soldiers and civilians. Although there was a cessation of hostilities in 2000, relations remained tense, mainly due to the unhappiness of the Ethiopian government over the conditions of the Algiers Agreement. This peace deal stipulated that the disputed border town of Badme, which was itself a principal reason for the conflict, would belong to Eritrea, a condition that Ethiopia could not accept. Thus, the embassies, phone lines and borders between the two countries were sealed, separating hundreds of people caught on either side, from their friends and families.

But things have changed under Ethiopia’s new prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, who announced an acceptance of the full terms of the Algiers Agreement and met with Eritrean president, Isaias Afwerki, to seal the deal.

A shot at peace?

But can it hold? As the confetti is swept up from the jubilant scenes and spectators look beyond the celebrations, this is the question everyone is asking.

There are four main threats to lasting peace: the specific terms of the peace deal; the Ethiopian military; the consequences for Afwerki’s regime; and the geo-political movements of the region.

1. Details of the deal

First, to the terms of the deal. Ethiopia will, despite having won the war, withdraw all military forces from the area awarded to Eritrea under the Algiers Agreement. But what does this mean for the Ethiopian residents in the disputed zones, who will surely object to suddenly becoming foreigners in their own homes? Furthermore, the two sides will have to agree on a whole host of political and economical regulations, not least the new borderline, as well as developing the infrastructure around it, which can always lead to tensions on the ground. Then, there are the new trade regulations that will have to be agreed upon, what tariffs will be imposed and many smaller but possibly destructive details.

2. The Ethiopian military

Until recently, they were the real power behind the government: it was them who fought and directed the war, losing tens of thousands of troops in the process, but essentially leading Ethiopia to victory. To them, the new deal is unlikely to be seen as anything more than a total capitulation to Eritrea. It will represent a further weakening of their power and influence both in Ethiopia and in the region. So far, they have complied. But whether their acquiescence will last remains to be seen.

3. Afwerki's grip on power

His regime has long been an autocracy, keeping a tight control on the civilian population, as well as the reins of government. And the Ethiopian threat has been one of the crucial justifications for his stranglehold of the country and his policy of conscription, which has maintained the Eritrean military’s strength. With the excuse gone, it will be harder for him to justify the need for such autocracy. Furthermore, open borders and the free flow of people will threaten his tight control on a no longer isolated population who yearn for change.

4. The regional geopolitics

With issues ranging from the rivalry between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia over control of the Nile to the spat between the Gulf States, whose influence abounds on the nations of the Horn, there are situations that imperil peace from every angle. In many international issues, Ethiopia and Eritrea have usually taken opposing sides, an overflow of their own dispute in the geo-politics of the region. Whether they can now change those views and agree on specific international issues that will almost certainly threaten to re-emerge once all the internal details are dealt with, also remains to be seen. If not, however, it could once again pit them against each other on the international stage and jeopardise all the hard work that has gone into creating peace.

These are issues that will have to be tackled once the dust has settled on the celebrations. If they can be resolved, it will likely herald a new age in relations in the Horn of Africa. If not, it could quickly spiral back to the tension of the last twenty years, or worse. The hand of history will be heavy upon the shoulders of these two leaders.

A question of numbers: Uhuru's pyrrhic victory?

Kenyans were divided in today's electoral rerun with many choosing not to vote. So, what does this all mean for Kenya's future?

Today, Kenyans were part of one of the strangest elections ever to have taken place. In many places across the country, polling stations were empty and polling staff idle after what will most certainly be one of the lowest turnouts in Kenyan electoral history. Many Kenyans refused to vote, following the call from Opposition Leader Raila Odinga to boycott the vote. Others were simply put off by the excessive police presence and the threat of clashes with protesters. Even polling stations in the strongholds of President Uhuru Kenyatta recorded less votes than those cast during the first election in August.

All of this is a result of a lengthy saga between Uhuru and Raila, after the Supreme Court declared the initial August vote, which Uhuru claimed victory in, invalid due to irregularities. Following this, Raila had stated that he would not take part in another election unless certain conditions were met, namely that the top officials for the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission were replaced. However, no changes were made, and, as a result, Raila withdrew his candidacy, leaving Uhuru to compete against several other contenders, none of whom had polled more than 1% in the first vote.

A hollow victory

Whilst today’s vote will certainly result in an Uhuru victory, it is a hollow one. With such low turnout, it is a sign that Kenyans have little faith in the electoral process, especially after a top IEBC official fled last week to New York after stating that this would not be a credible election. The next day, the CEO of the IEBC stated that he could not guarantee a credible process.

That means that whilst he may have won, Uhuru will lack legitimacy in the eyes of a large majority of Kenyans. Furthermore, he’ll lack much needed legitimacy in the eyes of international observers and press, many of whom stated prior to any votes being cast, that they did not believe in the credibility of what was to come.

A question of legitimacy

So, where to next? Does legitimacy matter to Uhuru? Probably not. His incendiary talk before this rerun pointed to a man who saw this whole episode as a minor speedbump on the road to another five years in power. But there are those around him that know that without widespread legitimacy, he can only rule by a heavy hand, something that would damage Kenyan economic interests, an upsetting situation for various Kenyans with powerful interests and a lot of influence.

For the opposition, the low turnout is a major victory following a stratagem that represented their only real choice to move forward. It was a risky one, but it has partly paid off, allowing them a chance to continue the narrative of a sham election, one that is supported by millions of Kenyans around the country, as demonstrated by today’s events.

The protests will continue, but they will be bigger and louder. The appeals to the Supreme Court will fly in, and the judges will be unable to ignore them (as several of them tried to do the day before the election, when they failed to turn up to court to hear a petition to postpone the election citing very dodgy excuses).

The elections are over. The people have spoken. But only two men can truly end this crisis. Uhuru has two options in response to the inevitable protests: first, he could respond with strongman tactics, use police force to crush protests, whilst encouraging his own supporters to stage counter protests. The result of such a strategy is grim, likely to ditch Kenya back to the events of 2008, when post-election violence resulted in at least 1000 deaths and 3 months of violence.

His other option is communication: he must sit down with Raila and attempt to negotiate a way forward. My prediction is that if he was to pursue a solution involving Raila, it would be one proposing a coalition government. Such a proposal would probably be advantageous to Uhuru: he may have to concede something but in the end he retains the majority of power. 

No deal?

Raila, too, will have his part to play in such tactics but it seems unlikely he would be willing to enter any coalition government especially with such support having been shown for him by a lack of participation in today’s election. The likelihood of his unwillingness to concede to a coalition solution  is further strengthened by the events of the past. He entered into a coalition government in 2008 in order to resolve the post-election violence — an agreement that arguably left him with little power. What he will settle for, I cannot say, but until they sit down in a room together, we will never know.

Through all of this, there is an encouraging factor. A tweet I saw today by a political analyst stated that what gave her hope was the nature of Kenyans. They all remember what happened 10 years ago, and whilst we have already seen sporadic incidents of violence in the past months, many will never forget 2007. Furthermore, Kenyans have a unique and humorous view of politics, one that encourages some light at the end of the tunnel.

Raila's political gamble: A weary exit or stroke of genius?

Raila Odinga has announced his departure from the Kenyan electoral re-run, in protest at the lack of change in the IEBC. So, is this the end for him or is there something more afoot?

It has certainly been a bit of a whirlwind for Kenyan politics in the short time since I posted my last blog, after the Kenyan eRlection in August. Events have taken a course that I feel sure even the best political analysts could not have predicted: first, after a petition by the National Super Alliance (NASA) led by Raila Odinga, the Supreme Court annulled the election result that gave the win to President Kenyatta, on the grounds that the poll had not been transparent. 

Then, after a fresh election date was set, and after failed calls by the opposition for the IEBC leadership to be replaced, Raila Odinga announced his withdrawal from the race, citing a lack of change in any of the regulations or people who manage the election. He also objected to a proposed Bill going through Parliament, which would prevent an annulment by the Supreme Court from happening again.

A historic moment

The Supreme Court ruling was a shock to all – the first time it has happened in Africa and only the second time anywhere. The immediate reaction was (somewhat patronisingly) applause by the West (as well as some embarrassed head bobbing by those EU and US observers who had declared the poll ‘free and fair’), jubilance from Raila supporters and anger from Uhuru fans.

In fairness, it was a historic moment: a court favouring a ruling that went against a sitting head of state. In many places around the world, not just Africa, that’s dangerous territory for a Supreme Court judge to wade into. But has it all been for nothing?

Having delivered a verdict which insinuated that, in one way or another, the IEBC had messed it all up, it seemed only logical for Raila to call for fresh IEBC personnel this time around. Was he ever going to get it? Highly unlikely. The court may have demonstrated its independence but that can only go so far. And with the same IEBC in place, and the same systems, you can understand his scepticism.

Time to gamble

But Raila’s next move, whilst being a major political gamble, is a stroke of genius. On the face of it, the whole thing seems like a great PR story: as tension builds with daily protests in the streets from both sides, and little political action to change any of the status quo, perhaps withdrawing is the best thing for a country that knows the consequences of ethnic tension, particularly after the 2007 election which culminated in violence that killed over 1000 people and displaced many more. His withdrawal, therefore, is in the interests of the people of Kenya.

On another level though, it’s a plan of political brilliance, from a man who appeared to have no real options. By withdrawing he achieves two things: first, he denies Uhuru and the IEBC any real legitimacy in the upcoming elections, his own withdrawal suggesting to the world that these elections will be no different from those held previously. 

Second, it allows him time to regroup. Whilst Kenyatta runs around campaigning, he can sit back and focus on other things (an intention made clear by his upcoming tour of the UK and US), and when Kenyatta wins the election, as he most certainly will, Raila can simply challenge the result in court again (assuming that the bill stopping another annulment has not been passed). Even without the Supreme Court, many Kenyans will find it hard to accept Uhuru, after a questionable election where the opposition had such little faith in the electoral commission that it saw no choice but to not take part.

The bottom line? By not running for president, Raila is changing the discourse, and controlling the narrative. It’s a move by a man who knows he has no other real choice. And a genius one at that.

As if to confirm that this, Deputy President William Ruto, Uhuru's running mate, made comments on Wednesday that seemed like an attempt to goad Raila into re-entering the race, a sign perhaps that his withdrawal had rattled them?

With Raila, it’s hard to imagine that this will be the end. Let’s not forget, he promised his political allies, many of whom are keen to take a turn at driving, to make this his last election and you’d imagine he’d go out with a bang.

So, what then? Calls for protests? Definitely. Almost certainly a legal challenge to whatever action the IEBC decides to take to move forward in this situation. But by controlling the narrative, the ball feels firmly in his court.

A constitutional crisis?

The news continues to roll in. The day after Raila quit, parliament passed an electoral amendment, which was boycotted by opposition lawmakers, stating that if one candidate withdrew from the re-run election, the remaining one would automatically win. At the same time, the High Court approved a petition by Ekuru Aukot, another presidential hopeful, to contest the upcoming ballot, although he has not definitely said he will run. These contradictory moves by the legislature and the judiciary will further complicate any way forward and could form the beginnings of a major constitutional crisis.

What we can be sure about is that this saga has a few more chapters in it and, looking back over all that has happened in the last two months, I’m not sure anyone can say what is coming next.